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Abstract 
In this paper we analyze a dynamic agency problem where contracting parties do not know the agent's 
future productivity at the beginning of the relationship. We consider a two-period model where both 
the agent and the principal observe the agent's second-period productivity at the end of the first period. 
This observation is assumed to be non-verifiable iriformation. We compare long-term contracts with 
short-term contracts with respect to their suitability to motivate effort in both periods. On the one hand, 
short-term contracts allow for a better fine-tuning of second-period incentives as they can be aligned 
with the agent's second-period productivity. On the other hand, in short-term contracts first-period 
effort incentives might be distorted as contracts have to be sequentially optimal. Hence, the difference 
between long-term and short-term contracts is characterized by a trade-off between inducing effort in 
the first and in the second period. We analyze the determinants of this trade-off and demonstrate its 
implications for performance measurement and iriformation system design. 
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1 Introduction 
The agency-theoretic literature has spent an enor-
mous amount of effort analyzing long-term in-
centive problems (e.g., Lambert 1983, Fudenberg, 
Holmstrom, and Milgram 1990, Chiappori, Macho, 
Rey, and Salanie 1994, or Christensen, Feltham, 
and ~abac 2005). Two aspects are of particular 
relevance in this literature: The (dis-)ability of 
parties to commit to a long-term contract and the 
distinction between observability and verifiability 
of information.1 When contracting is complete in 
the sense that all jointly observable variables are 
verifiable, long-term commitment has proven to 
be valuable. Given complete contracts each antic-
ipated future contract change can be included in 
the initial long-term contract such that there is no 
need to modify the contract subsequently. Rather, 
limited commitment may worsen the outcome as 
contracting parties are forced to act sequentially 
1 See Bolton (1990) for an overview. 
optimal, while with long-term commitment they 
can commit to strategies that are not sequentially 
optimal. Roughly stated, short-term contracting or 
renegotiation is ex ante efficient only if there is no 
difference between ex-ante optimality and ex-post 
optimality.2 
For real incentive problems, however, it is reason-
able to assume that contracting parties are better 
informed than, e.g., a court that would enforce the 
contract in the case of a dispute.3 Most transac-
tions and relationships are very specific such that a 
court is not able to interpret data in the manner an 
insider would. In such a setting the complete con-
tracting assumption is violated and the notion of 
a characteristic of the relationship being "observ-
able but not verifiable" has been introduced into 
2 Fudenberg, Holmstrom, and Milgrom (1990) and Chiappori, 
Macho, Rey, and Salanie (1994) developed criteria that en· 
sure identity of ex-post optimality and ex-ante optimality in 
complete contracts. 
3 See Hermalin and Katz (1991). 
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the literature. If contracting parties jointly observe 
variables that are not verifiable the possibility of 
renegotiation or short-term contracting might im-
prove the outcome of the relationship, as it allows 
to incorporate implicitly non-verifiable informa-
tion into the contract. A very prominent analysis 
of this kind is Hermalin and Katz (1991) where the 
agent's effort is observable but not verifiable. 
A general lesson from analyzing long-term incen-
tive problems is that slight changes in the informa-
tion structure may have substantial consequences 
for the outcome of the agency4 and therefore may 
lead to different recommendations for optimal per-
formance management and information system 
design. In this sense, e.g., Lambert (2001) empha-
sizes the need to investigate long-term incentive 
problems especially related to commitment issues 
to attain a deeper understanding of the impact of 
performance measurement in dynamic agencies. 
In this paper we model a long-term agency rela-
tionship that brings two of the issues mentioned 
before together. On the one hand, contracting par-
ties observe non-verifiable information during the 
relationship which facilitates spot commitment as 
future effort incentives can be improved. On the 
other hand, short-term contracts may distort early 
effort incentives as they have to be sequentially 
optimal. Hence, the preferability of a long-term 
contract or spot contracting depends on the im-
portance of early effort relative to late effort. 
We consider a two-period agency relationship in 
which the contracting parties privately observe the 
agent's second-period productivity at the end of the 
first period. The idea underlying this assumption is 
that the manager's future contribution to both firm 
value and performance measures is uncertain ex 
ante but becomes more transparent by observing 
the production process over time. 
Within this setting we analyze the trade-off be-
tween early and late effort motivation by compar-
ing short-term contracts with long-term contracts. 
This trade-off is shown to be critically influenced by 
strategic effort and potential multi-tasking prob-
lems. Furthermore, the variance of the agent's pro-
ductivity is an important factor; not due to risk-
sharing considerations but by virtue of a costly 
effort allocation across different states of nature. 
In short-term contracts we further distinguish if 
4 Compare e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) with Hermalin 
and Katz (1991). 
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the agent's effort is unobservable or observable but 
not verifiable.s We do so for two reasons: First, it 
allows us to clearly confine how the specific deter-
minants of first- and second-period effort motiva-
tion vary with (small) changes in the information 
structure. Second, the analysis of observable but 
not-verifiable actions is applicable to a couple of 
real-world situations6 and itself generates inter-
esting results, in particular a full separation of 
periods. 
Having analyzed the trade-off between first- and 
second-period effort motivation we demonstrate 
implications for performance measurement and 
information system design. We first analyze the 
value of productivity information for the agency. 
It is well known7 that in strategic interactions 
(games) additional information may have negative 
value. It has been shown by Demski and Frimor 
(1999) and Indjejikian and Nanda (1999) amongst 
others that information rationing - for instance, 
via aggregation of information - might be bene-
ficial in dynamic incentive problems. Most of the 
papers showing this effect are dealing in a com-
plete contracting world where the only information 
available is the verifiable performance measures. 
In the model employed here, however, we investi-
gate the value of an unverifiable signal in a dynamic 
setting. Not observing the signal may be beneficial 
as it may prevent contracting pa1ties from taking 
second-period decisions that distort first-period 
decisions. In addition, in long-term contracts not 
observing the agent's productivity may be opti-
mal to avoid an ex-ante uncontrollable random 
second-period action taken by the manager. 
The accounting system of the firm can be inter-
preted as the information system providing the 
measures for the compensation contract with the 
manager.8 We apply our model to compare two 
different types of revenue recognition, the per-
centage of completion method and the completed 
5 As in long-term contracts the principal cannot react on the 
observation of the agent's actions, we do not need to distinguish 
whether or not the agent's effort is observable. 
6 Consider relationships where both contracting parties work 
close together such that the principal can directly observe which 
actions the agent has taken without being able to formally prove 
them. Furthermore, there might be a subjective performance 
measure that allows the principal directly to infer the agent's 
action. The literature on implicit contracts often presumes that 
the agent's effort itself is the subjective measure that can be 
implicitly contracted upon (see, e.g., Bul1 1987). 
7 For example see Demski (1988). 
8 See Ch1i stensen and Demski (2003), chapter 11 ff. 
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contract method, as different means to control the 
agent's effort in a long-term construction contract. 
In contrast to Arnegger and Hofmann (2007), who 
compare both methods under the full-commitment 
assumption, we are particularly interested in ana-
lyzing them under limited commitment in combi-
nation with unverifiable information. In a broader 
sense our analysis can be interpreted as compar-
ing cash accounting to accrual accounting. In this 
aspect our paper is related to the literature on 
comparing accounting systems in dynamic agen-
cies: Kwon (1989) considers a two-period setting 
with full commitment. The main emphasis of his 
paper is to analyze the trade-off between risk and 
incentives regarding the timing of information. 
Reichelstein (2ooo) analyzes performance mea-
sures based on cash flows and on accruals (resid-
ual income). The objective is to implement incen-
tive schemes that induce the agent to put effort 
into finding investment projects and then to re-
alize only profitable projects. Wagenhofer (2003) 
considers a sequence of short-term contracts in a 
model where the agent's effort has long-term and 
short-term consequences. He analyzes optimal de-
preciation rules that induce the desired incentives 
by transferring part of the contribution of the long-
term action in the period of choice. 
Finally, our paper is related to the literature on 
the congruity of performance measures in multi-
task-models. In the standard multi-task model9 the 
principal's objective (firm value) is not contractible 
and the manager's effort has to be allocated across 
different tasks. Specific multi-task models are ana-
lyzed by Baker (1992), Kopel (1998), and Bushman, 
Indjejikian, and Penno (2ooo ). They analyze a one-
shot full commitment problem with private pre-
decision information. The agent privately observes 
his productivity after the contracting date. Baker 
and Kopel show that agency costs may occur even 
with risk-neutral parties if the principal cannot op-
timally allocate the agent's effort across different 
states of nature. Bushman, Indjejikian, and Pen no 
analyze the delegation of decision rights. In a cen-
tralized regime the agent's effort is contractible 
but productivity is not observable, whereas in a 
decentralized system the agent privately observes 
his productivity but effort is non-contractible. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In 
9 See Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), Felt ham and Xie (1994), 
and Datar, Cohen Kulp, and Lambert (2001). 
the next section we introduce the model. In Sec-
tion 3 we conduct the equilibrium analysis for the 
three contracting regimes considered in this pa-
per. Section 4 analyzes the determinants of the 
trade-off between early and late effort. In Section 
5 we demonstrate implications for performance 
measurement and information system design and 
Section 6 summarizes. 
2 Themodel 
In this section we introduce the model. We use the 
most parsimonious model that allows to capture 
the relevant trade-offs between late and early ef-
fort motivation. Nonetheless, we are anxious to 
interpret the results in terms of a more gen-
eral economic environment besides the specifics 
of the model. We consider a two-period agency-
relationship between a risk-neutral principal and a 
risk-neutral agent (manager), both having unlim-
ited liability. The firm's lifetime exceeds the dura-
tion of the agency and the principal's firm value is 
not contractible. The latter assumption applies to 
non-public firms that will not be valuated at the 
capital market, or, in a non-valuation context, it 
is evident if the firm's output is realized only after 
the termination of the agency. We assume that 
non-contractibility goes along with non-congruity 
of financial measures. This means, that the agent's 
contribution to the financial measures of the two 
periods does not coincide with the contribution of 
his actions to firm value. 10 
The principal's information system reports the fol-
lowing performance measures Yt at the end of 
period t = 1, 2 
Yl Vu e u + V 12e12 + f/1 
Y2 V21e11 + ee2 + T/2· 
Here e~ = (en , e12 ) are the manager's first-period 
actions and e2 is his second-period effort. Actions 
are non-verifiable, but they might be observable. 
We assume that the manager has to perform two 
tasks in the first period: a strategic11 (long-term) 
10 Non-congruity captures the fact that a firm's future potential 
is represented by its financial measures with a time lag (see 
Sliwka 2002). The relevance of this problem is reflected by the 
rising attention that is devoted to non-financial components in 
compensation contracts (see Sliwka 2002 and Budde 2007} 
11 See also Sliwka (2002) and Dutta and Reichelstein (2003) 
for an analysis of long-term and short-term contracts (or 
renegotiation-proof contracts, respectively) with strategic ef-
fort. 
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action e11 that influences the performance in both 
periods and an operational (short-term) action 
e12 that only influences first-period performance. 
v1 = ( v 11, v12 )' is the (marginal) productivity vec-
tor of first-period effort in performance measure 
YI and vz = ( v2I, 0)' is the productivity vector of 
ei in performance measure y2 • We assume vi ;:::: 0, 
i.e. VI ~ 0 but VI # 0, and v21 ;:::: 0 throughout 
the analysis. As allocating the agent's effort across 
several tasks in the second period does not create 
an interesting problem in our setting, we model 
second-period effort as a one-dimensional action 
e2. The agent's productivity in the second period, e' 
is a random variable from the ex-ante perspective, 
continuously distributed on a subset of the posi-
tive real numbers. The realization of the random 
variable e will be jointly observed by both parties 
at the end of period one; however, e is assumed to 
be non-verifiable information such that the con-
tracting parties cannot write an explicit contract 
on it. The additive noise terms r71 and r72 are in-
dependently distributed each with strictly positive 
density on ( - oo, oo) 12 and E (r11) = E ('172) = 0. 
171 and 172 are also independently distributed of e. 
We restrict compensation contracts to be affine-
linear13 functions of the performance measures. 
The compensation function of period t is given 
by St = StYt + Ft , with Ft as a fixed payment 
and St 14 as the incentive weight of period t. The 
agent's disutility from performing effort in pe-
riod 1 is C1 ( et) = e~ e t/2 and for period 2 it is 
C2 ( e2 ) = eU2. His reservation utility is set to zero 
in each period without loss of generality. 
The principal's firm value is given by 
Here 911 and 912 are the marginal productivities of 
first-period actions e11 and e12 and 1 2 is the pro-
ductivity of action e2 • Like e 1 2 is a random vari-
able continuously distributed on some subset of 
R+. e and 12 have a joint distribution f (e, 12 ) with 
stochastic independence f (8, 12) = fe (B) f-.12 (12) 
as a special case. The realization of 12 will never be 
12 This assumption ensures that even if v21 is zero the observa-
tion of() and y 2 does not reveal action e 2. 
13 Linear contracts are a usual assumption in models of perfor-
mance measurement in agencies with risk-neutral parties, see 
for instance Baker (1992) and Budde (2007). 
14 We do not restrict incentive weights to be defined on [0, 1]. 
While this restriction is natural in a one-shot agency where 
the principal's outcome is contractible, with a non-contractible 
firm value it leads to corner solutions that are hard to interpret. 
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detected by the parties; however, the observation 
of e may lead to a revision of the distribution of 12 • 
The assumption that e is observed after the first 
period but 12 is not is driven by the idea that the 
influence of the agent's second-period action on 
the second-period performance measure is more 
precisely measurable than its effect on firm value. 
T/n is a random variable distributed with strictly 
positive density on ( -oo, oo) with E ( r1n) = 0. 12 
and '1?1r are independently distributed of all other 
random variables of the model. As argued above 
the contribution of the agent's actions to firm value 
does not coincide with the contribution of the ac-
tions to the sum of YI and y2 , i.e. the relations 
911 = V11 + V2I, 9I2 = V12, and / 2 = 8 do not hold 
simultaneously. 
If the principal offers a contract at the beginning of 
period t, the optimal offer depends on his informa-
tion set at the beginning of period t. The principal's 
expected firm value given his information at the 
beginning of period 1 is 
and his expectation at the beginning of the second 
period given the observation of y1 and e and given 
his conjecture aboutthe agent's first-period actions 
el (if effort is unobservable) is 
(1) E(7r I Yl, () , e l ) = gn e n + 912e12 + E("Y2 I ())e2 (e) . 
If the principal can observe the agent's actions we 
remove the carets in (1). Since the manager knows 
eat his second-period action choice we write e2 (B). 
Notice that in contrast to the usual assumption the 
second-period firm value productivity is generally 
not stationary in this model. Expectations at the 
beginning of the relationship are E ( 1 2 ) and after 
the first period expectations are E ( 12 I B). 
The distinction between observable and unobserv-
able effort is material only with regard to first-
period actions. Whether the second-period action 
is observable to the principal or not does not mat-
ter as after the second-period action choice the 
game is effectively over. Although we model risk-
neutral contracting parties with unlimited liability 
due to multi-tasking there is still an interesting 
incentive problem present. Two assumptions are 
important in this respect: First, the agent has to 
allocate his effort across several tasks, and second, 
the principal's objective is not contractible. Given 
non-contractibility of firm value "selling the firm 
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to the agent" is formally excluded as a solution to 
the incentive problem.1s 
Then, agency costs may occur even with risk-
neutral contracting parties if the agent's effort 
cannot be optimally controlled across his tasks 
via the performance measures. With the two as-
sumptions of non-contractibility and multi-tasking 
the literature does not focus on the classical trade-
off between risk and incentives in the first place 
but has developed a tool to analyze the problem 
of inefficient allocation of effort due to distorted 
performance measurement. 16 While most of the 
multi-tasking literature assumes a one-shot agency 
with full commitment, in this paper the multi-task 
problem is integrated into a dynamic incentive 
problem with unverifiable information. 
3 Equilibrium solutions 
In this section we derive the equilibrium solutions 
for the three contracting regimes to be compared 
in this paper: long-term contracts, short-term con-
tracts with unobservable effort, and short-term 
contracts with observable effort. In long-term con-
tracts with full commitment, by definition both 
contracting parties are forced to stay throughout 
the two contracting periods. In short-term con-
tracts neither the principal nor the agent are com-
mitted to working together for the full length of the 
agency. Generally, the principal's strategy includes 
the possibility to hire a different agent for the 
second period. Following part of the literature17 
in short-term contracts we exogenously restrict 
attention to equilibria where the principal wants 
the agent to work for him for the full duration of 
the agency.18 This restriction is justified if costs 
of hiring a new agent for the second period are 
sufficiently high. 
15 Literally, selling the firm to an agent should always be possible 
no matter whether firm value is contractible or not. However, 
from a practical perspective this is not an applicable solution 
to an incentive problem such that excluding it formally by 
assuming non-contractibility of the firm value is justified. 
16 See Holmstrom and Milgram (1991), Feltham and Xie (1994), 
and Baker (2000). 
17 See, e.g., Meyer and Vickers (1997), Indjejikian and anda 
(1999), and Feltham, Indjejikiru1, and anda (2006). 
18 The possibility to replace the agent at the end of the first 
period by a different agent is analyzed in Christensen and 
Feltham (2005), p. 559ff, and in $abac (2007). 
3.1 Long-term contracts 
Here we assume that both parties can commit to 
a two-period relationship and to not renegotiating 
the initial long-term contractS= (S1 , Sz). Long-
term commitment is a strong assumption as it 
assumes contracting parties can stick to the ini-
tial contract at later dates even if it is no longer 
efficient. We interpret long-term commitment as 
a benchmark and by comparing it to contracting 
environments with limited commitment we try to 
identify under which circumstances it is optimal 
to seek commitment devices to approach the full-
commitment solution. In a long-term contract it 
is immaterial for the outcome of the game if the 
agent's actions are observable or not. Even if effort 
was observable, the principal cannot use this in-
formation as he is committed to not renegotiating 
the initial contract. 
In the long-term commitment setting the specifics 
of the contract S = (S1, S2 ) will be fixed at the 
beginning of the relationship. To solve for the op-
timal long-term contract we begin with analyzing 
the agent's second-period action choice. At the be-
ginning of the second period the agent (as well 
as the principal) has observed his second-period 
performance productivity e. His optimal second-
period action conditional on e for a given contract 
S = (S1 , S2 ) is given by19 
argmaxe' E (Fz + szyz I fJ) - Cz ( e2) 
2 
' ( e2) 2 
argmaxe;F2 + s2fJe2 + SzVz t eu- - 2 -
szB. 
The agent's ex-ante expected payoff with contract 
S and given e2 (e) = Sze is then given by 
+ 
E (F1 + s1 y1 + Fz + szyz (ez (tl))) 
C1 (e1 ) - E [Cz (ez (tl))] 
F1 + St (vnen + v12e12) + Fz 
s~E(t12 ) ei1 eiz 
szv21en + 2 - 2- 2 · 
From the optimality condition dE (ITA) j de1 = 0 
we derive the optimal first-period actions as 
19 As y1 is independent of all other random variables we do not 
explicitly mention it in expressing conditional expectations in 
what follows. 
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The optimal long-term contract is then the solution 
to the following optimization problem 
max E (1r- s1Y1- F1 - S2Y2 - F2) 
F l ,S l ,F2 , S2 
s.t. 
e1 = (s1v11 + s2v21 ,s1v12)1 
e2 (B)= s2B 
E (ITA) 2;. 0. 
The principal maximizes the net value of the firm 
taking into account the participation constraint 
(E (II A) :::;. 0) and the incentive constraints for the 
actions in both periods. 
Lemma 1 : The optimal incentive weights (si, s2 ) 
and the principal's equilibrium payoff (IIL) in a 





v§1912V12 + E ( B2) (gn Vn + 912V12) 
( 2) ( 2 2 ) 2 2 E e Vu + v12 + v12v21 
vu v21E (r2B) 
E ( 12B) ( vi1 + vi2) + vr2gu v21 
E (B2) (vil + vi2) + vi2v§1 
V21 V11912V12 
2 [E (B2) (vr1 + vr2) + vr2v§1] 
E ( B2) ( V12912 + 911 Vn) 2 
2 [E (B2) (vr1 + vr2) + vr2v§1] 
2E (r2B) V21 (gu Vf2 - 912Vn V12) 
2 [E (B2) (vr1 + vr2) + vr2v§1] 
E ( e)2 ( 2 2 ) /2 V12 + Vu 
Proof. See Appendix. • 
3.2 Short-term contracts 
3.2.1 Unobservable effort 
Now we assume that the contracting parties have 
only limited commitment power such that they can 
only agree on short-term one-period contracts. At 
20We suppressed the optimal fixed payments F{ and F2 in 
Lemma 1. They are crucial to ensuring that the agent's partici-
pation constraint is binding but do not affect incentives. As our 
focus is on incentive effects we waive presentation of explicit 
solutions for all fixed payments that do not influence incentives 
here and in the following sections. 
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the beginning of the first period the principal offers 
the first-period contract S1 and at the end of the 
first period (i.e. after y1 and e have been observed) 
the principal offers the second-period contract 52 • 
Christensen, Feltham, and ,;labac (2003) have shown 
in a two-period agency with short-term contracts 
that there exists no equilibrium in which the agent 
stays for both periods if performance measures 
are correlated and the agent is not committed to 
stay for both periods. With correlation the optimal 
second-period contract depends on the principal's 
conjecture about the agent's first-period effort. 
Given the principal conjectures that the agent has 
chosen the first-period effort that is optimal if 
he stays for two periods, the agent has an incen-
tive to "take the money and run" after the first 
period. Although in our model performance mea-
sures are not correlated, the same strategy for the 
agent shows to be optimal as first- and second-
period measures are connected through strategic 
effort e11. To sustain an equilibrium in which the 
agent stays for the full duration of the agency we 
assume "fair contracts"21 in combination with a 
commitment of the agent to stay for both periods. 
Fairness refers to a commitment of the principal 
to offer a second-period contract S2 that meets 
the agent's second-period participation constraint 
given he has performed the desired (conjectured) 
first-period actions. Given fairness the agent can 
commit to stay for both periods without running 
the risk of being exploited by the principal in the 
second period. 
Beginning with Baron and Besanko's (1987) in-
vestigation of a dynamic regulatory relationship, 
fair contracts have been (explicitly and implicitly) 
assumed in a number of contributions to the liter-
ature. 22 The use of fair contracts relies on the idea 
that a court can enforce fairness by reviewing the 
compensation contracts offered.2 3 If the principal 
was not forced to offer a fair contract at the begin-
ning of the second period, fairness is ex-post inef-
ficient and the agent would never commit to stay-
ing for both periods. Interestingly, Christensen, 
Feltham, and ,;;abac (2003) show in a LEN model 
the formal identity of fair short-term contracts 
and a long-term renegotiation-proof contract that 
21 See Baron and Besanko (1987) and Christen en, Feltham, 
and ~abac (2003). 
22 See Meyer (1995), Meyer and Vickers (1997), and Indjejikian 
and anda (1999). 
23 See Baron and Besanko (1987), p. 419. 
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seems to be more accepted2 4 in the literature. As 
in our dynamic model contracting parties observe 
unverifiable information, no such equivalence can 
be shown. We employ fairness to preclude opti-
mality of the "take the money and run" strategy by 
the agent presuming that fairness is enforceable by 
a court. 
Given a second-period contract S2 = F2 + s2y2 the 
agent selects his second-period effort according to 
(2) as e2 (B) = s2e. The agent accepts the contract 
only if his second-period payoff conditional on e 
and e 1 is at least zero. 
E(F2+s2Y2I B,e1) -C2(e2(B)) > 0. 
-¢=> 
e2 ( 8)2 
F2 + S2 (v21ell + ee2 (B)) - -2- > 0. 
The principal's optimal second-period contract of-
fer given conjecture el is then characterized by the 
solution to the following optimization program: 
s.t. 
e2 (B)= s2e 
E (F2 + 82Y2 1 e, el)- C2 (e2 (B))::::: o. 
Since the principal designs the contract without 
having observed first-period effort we replaced 
el by the conjecture el within the participation 
constraint in program (4). Let e]' denote the con-
jectured first-period equilibrium action given the 
agent stays for both periods, then fairness means 
that the principal can commit ex ante to a second-
period contract that fulfills 
E (F2 + S2Y2 I e, ei) - c2 (e2 (B)) ::::: 0. 
Lemma 2 : The optimal second-period contract 
given conjecture e1 is given by s2* = E( i I B) and 
F.S* - - E ('Y2 IB) - - l E ( I e) 2 2 - e v21en 2 'Y2 . 
Proof. See Appendix. • 
Given the optimal second-period action e2 (B) 
8 2 8 and the anticipated second-period contract 
S~* = (F.],* , 82*) conditional on e 1, we move to 
the first stage of the game to determine optimal 
first-period actions and the optimal first-period 
contract. The agent's expected surplus from the 
two-period relationship is given by 
24 See Christensen, Feltham, and Sabac (2003, p. 429), but also 
see the reply by Indjejikian and Nanda (2003, p. 440). 
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(5) 
C1 (e i) - E [C2 (e2 (B))] 
F1 + s1 (vn en + v12e12) 
( 1'2) - eii + e~2 + E 0 v21 (en - en ) - 2 · 
Maximizing this objective function for eu and e12 
yields the following optimal actions for a given 
incentive weight 8 1 : 
(6) e1 = (81Vn + E(~) v21 i s1v12)' 
Then, the principal's problem in determining the 
optimal first-period contract is the following 
(?) 
- E (F1 + BIYl + F!J.* + s~* y2) 
s.t. 
e 1 = ( s1 vn + E ( ~2 ) v21; s 1 v12) 1 
A e2 + e2 • E (rr ) = F1 + s1 (vuen +v12el2) -~ 2:0. Notice 
that in equilibrium, conjectures about eu are con-
sistent with (7) such that the term 
E en V21 (en- en ) vanishes within the partici-
pation constraint. Given that the optimal second-
period contract provides the agent with his second-
period reservation utility of zero, his ex-ante ex-
pected total surplus E (ITA) equals exactly the ex-
pected surplus from the first contract. The optimal 
fixed payment F1 will be chosen such that the par-
ticipation constraint of program (8) is binding. The 
optimal incentive weight s]* for period one and the 
equilibrium payoffii5 of the principal are given in 
Lemma3: 
Proof. See Appendix. • 
3.2.2 Observable effort 
Whether the agent's actions are observable or not 
by the principal certainly depends on the terms of 
25 As the optimal first-period fixed payment does not influence 
the agent's incentives we omit it in Lemma 3 and in the following 
subsection, see also Footnote 20. 
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the relationship. The assumption of observability 
of actions is justified if principal and agent work 
very closely together, if there exists a subjective 
measure that allows the principal to unambigu-
ously infer the actions, or if the principal is able 
to implement a monitoring technology that per-
fectly reveals the agent's actions without serving 
as a proof from a juridical perspective. In a multi-
period incentive problem with spot contracts the 
observability ofthe agent's actions is crucial as the 
principal will use observed actions to fine-tune the 
contract for the next period. 
When the principal can observe but not verify the 
agent's effort the only formal difference to the pre-
vious section is that the principal can condition 
the second-period contract on his observation of 
the first-period actions e 1 instead of his conjecture 
e1. With observable effort we do not need to apply 
the fairness concept to sustain an equilibrium as 
the agent cannot "fool" the principal. According 
to Lemma 2, the optimal second-period contract 
S2,* = (F2*, s2*) given observation e1 is given by 
s2* = s~* = E(i;lll) and 
F.O* E(-)'2 111) lE( I 8)2 26 2 = --11-v2l en- 2 'Y2 • 
Compared to the analysis in the previous subsec-
tion, the term E n2 ) V21 (en- en) in the agent's 
first-period optimization problem disappears as he 
knows that the principal will offer a second-period 
contract that provides him exactly with his reser-
vation utility in the second period for every action 
vector e1 he performed in period one. As a result, 
the effect of the agent's first-period strategic ac-
tion en on second-period performance measure y2 
does not affect his first-period action choice. An-
ticipating the optimal second-period contract, the 
agent cannot influence his expected second-period 
compensation via e1 and therefore in equilibrium 
the strategic effect of first -period effort disappears. 
Essentially, in equilibrium the observation of(first-
period) effort leads to a perfect separation of both 
periods. The second-period performance measure 
Y2 is used to motivate the (ex post) optimal second-
period action e2 and the first-period measure y1 
is used to control e1 . The principal's expected 
payoff from the second period is identical to the 
unobservable effort case and equals 
26 The fact that optimal second-period fixed payments in both 
short-term regimes, F.f* and Ff*, are negative is due to the 
assumption of a second-period reservation utility of zero and 
does not imply that the agent generally has to make an upfront 
payment to the principal. 
* ( 2) Z2 = E ('Y2e2 (8))- E e2 (8) / 2 = 
= E b28s2) - E (82s22 ) /2 = ~E { E ("(2 I 8)2 } . 
The principal's optimal expected payoff from the 
first period (Zf*) is the solution to the following 
optimization program, which characterizes a stan-
dard one-shot incentive problem where two actions 
en and e12 have to be aligned via the performance 
measure y 1 with firm value 1r: 
(8) max gn eu + g12e12 - F1 - s 1 (vn eu + v12q2 ) 
s 1,F1 
s.t. 
e~ = (s1V11,S1V12) 
2 2 
F1 + s1 ( vuen + v12e12) - e11 - e12 > 0. 
2 2 -
Lemma 4: The optimal incentive rate resulting 
from program (8) iS 8°* = gll V~ l +g1 2 V1 2 the prin-
l vfl +vf2 ' 
cipal's corresponding first-period surplus is 
Zf* = (gu v,~ +g,;vd2 , and his total surplus is 
2( v11 +v;:2) 
rrso = zo*+Z.* = (gnvn+9!2V!2)2 +lE {E (rv· I 8)2} 
1 2 2(v2 + v 2 ) 2 12 • 
11 12 
Proof. See Appendix. • 
4 Analyzing the basic trade-off: 
Early vs. late effort motivation 
In this section we analyze the preferability oflong-
or short-term contracts building on the analysis 
of the previous section. The general advantage of 
short-term contracts is that the contracting parties 
can use unverifiable information (here: the agent's 
true productivity or the observation of first -period 
effort) to fine-tune the optimal second-period con-
tractwhile the general disadvantage is that they will 
agree on a second-period contract that is ex-post 
optimal and possibly destroys first-period incen-
tives. In long-term contracts without renegotiation 
it is the other way around. The optimal contract is 
forward looking in the sense that it incorporates 
the effect of first-period effort on second-period 
performance, i.e. contracting parties can commit 
to second-period contracts that are ex-post ineffi-
cient. On the other hand, they cannot react on new 
(unverifiable) information. We study this trade-
off by comparing the three contracting regimes 
analyzed in the previous section. Which regime 
is preferred depends on the "importance" of the 
second-period effort relative to the first-period ef-
fort with respect to both, the agent's performance 
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measures and firm value. In this section we inves-
tigate the determinants of this trade-off and in the 
next section we demonstrate implications for per-
formance measurement and information system 
design. 
We first analyze the problem of motivating efficient 
first-period effort in sequentially optimal con-
tracts. As we do not consider risk -sharing problems 
the only difference in motivating effort in short-
term contracts compared with long-term contracts 
is that the sequentially optimal second-period con-
tract possibly reduces the set of implementable 
first-period actions. In short-term contracts the 
second-period bonus coefficient will be optimized 
for the second-period effort alone while in long-
term contracts it can be used to directly control 
first-period effort if there are long-term perfor-
mance effects. The following proposition states a 
sufficient condition27 such that sequentially op-
timal contracts do not reduce the set of imple-
mentable first-period actions. 
Proposition 1: If first-period effort productiv-
ities v 1 and v 2 are linearly dependent ex-ante 
efficientfirst-period actions can be motivated in 
sequentially optimal contracts. 
Proof. From (3), (7), and (8) we know induced 
first-period effort in the three contracting regimes 
is given byef = v1s1 + v2s2, ef = v1s1 + v2E en, 
and ef0 = v 1s1. Let ef* = visr + v 2s2 denote the 
ex-ante efficient first-period effort induced via the 
long-term contract. If v 1 and v 2 are linearly de-
pendent, ef* = v1 (si + As2) , A -=1- 0. In short-term 
contracts setting sf* = si + A (s2 - E (if)) and 
sf* = si + As2, respectively, induces the ex-ante 
efficient first-period effort ef*. • 
Recall that vi= (v11 ,v12)' and v2 = (v2t,O) 'are 
the productivity vectors of effort e1 = (en, ei2)' 
in the performance measures y1 and y2 • By defini-
tion action ei2 has no long-term consequences and 
e n has long-term consequences if v21 > 0. This 
modeling allows us to capture both, a potential 
multi-task problem as there are two tasks but only 
one measure in period 1 and possible long-term 
consequences of effort. Given this structure, we 
can interpret the algebraic result of proposition 1 
as follows: a welfare loss in short-term contracts 
2 7 Compare Schiindube (2005) for a similar condition in a 
model with complete contracts. 
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(relative to long-term contracting) requires strate-
gic consequences of first-period effort as well as a 
multi-task-problem in period 1. Only if these two 
conditions occur simultaneously, v 1 and v 2 are 
linearly independent. Assume first that there are 
no strategic consequences, v21 = 0, which implies 
linear dependency of v 1 and v 2 • With v21 = 0 first-
period effort incentives are determined solely by 
the first-period performance YI which can be con-
tracted on in an ex-ante optimal manner anyway. 
Even with strategic consequences of first-period 
effort, v2I > 0, linear independence of vi and v2 
requires vi2 > 0. That means, besides the strategic 
effect of first-period effort, there must be more 
tasks than performance measures in period one 
(here: two tasks en and ei2 and one measure yt)28 • 
For v12 = 0 the only task in period one is e u . e n 
alone can always be optimally controlled by adapt-
ing s1 in either regime. If there is a multi-task 
problem plus strategic effort in period 1, however, 
ex-ante efficiency generally requires to use the 
second-period measure explicitly to control first-
period effort which is impossible in short-term 
contracts. 
The ex-ante efficiency condition in proposition 
1 is sufficient but it is not necessary for imple-
menting ex-ante efficient first-period actions in 
short-term contracts. Even with a constrained set 
of implementable actions due to sequentially op-
timal contracts the ex-ante efficient first-period 
actions might be implementable in some cases. 
These cases depend on the agent's firm value pro-
ductivities as well as on the distribution of (12 , B) 
and can only be interpreted case by case. The con-
dition of proposition 1, however, only depends on 
the characteristics of the performance measures 
and ensures that all first-period actions that can be 
motivated in long-term contracts can be motivated 
in short-term contracts as well. 
Shmt-term contracts with observable and with un-
observable effort always generate the same second-
period incentives. The difference is with regard to 
first-period incentives. With observable effort both 
periods are perfectly separated in the sense that the 
two-period agency problem can be decomposed in 
two separate one-shot problems: The first-period 
effort will be motivated solely by YI and e2 will 
28 Note that v2 1 > 0 guarantees that task e11 is non-trivially 
existent. Given v 2 1 > 0, the existence of a multi-task problem 
requires v 1 2 > 0. 
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be induced via y2 . In contrast, with unobservable 
effort the agent takes the impact of his first-period 
effort on the second-period performance into ac-
count. For the condition given in proposition 1, 
however, short-term contracts with observable and 
unobservable effort generate identical first-period 
actions as there is either no strategic action or 
there is no multi-task problem in period one. Fur-
thermore, as in long-term contracts second-period 
incentives cannot be based on the actual second-
period productivity, they are weakly dominated 
under the condition of Proposition 1: 
Corollary 1: Given that ex-ante efficient first-
period actions can be implemented in sequen-
tially optimal contracts, short-term contracts are 
(weakly) preferred to long-term contracts, i.e. II8 
= IISo ~ IIL. 
Given that first-period incentives are the same, the 
advantage of short-term contracting is that con-
tracting parties can use the observed productivity 
e to fine-tune the characteristics of the second-
period contract whereas in long-term contracts 
these characteristics must be determined based on 
prior beliefs on e. The next proposition identifies 
under which circumstances the ability to use the 
productivity e to fine-tune second-period incen-
tives in short-term contracts is worthless. 
Proposition 2: Sequentially optimal second- pe-
riod incentives are implementable in long-term 
contracts if and only if E ( "Y2 I B) = c · e, where cis 
a positive constant. 
Proof. Sequentially optimal incentives are given 
by s~* = E('i: IB) . s~* can be implemented in long-
term contracts only if s~* does not depend on e as 
contracting occurs before e will be observed. s2 is 
independent of e if and only if E (12 I B) = c · e. As 
"(2 and e can take only positive values, c > 0 .• 
Corollary 2: If E ("Y2 I B)= c . e, then IIL ~ IT8 . 
If the sequentially optimal incentive rate does not 
depend on e the principal can motivate the same 
second-period effort in long-term contracts as in 
short-term contracts. This directly implies that the 
principal could replicate the outcome of short-
term contracts with unobservable effort by a long-
term contract and therefore II L ~ II 8 . On the 
other hand, the equilibrium outcome of short-
term contracts with observable actions in general 
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cannot be imitated by a long-term contract as the 
incentive constraints differ. 
Combining Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 leads 
to: 
Corollary 3: Given the conditions in Proposition 
1 and Proposition 2 apply simultaneously, this 
results in: II8 = II 5° = II L. 
The conditions in Proposition 1 and 2 ensure that 
the comparative advantages of either regime, long-
term or short-term contracts, vanish. On the one 
hand, there is no need to use the second-period 
contract for first-period effort motivation (which 
would be possible in long-term contracts but not 
in short-term contracts) and, on the other hand, 
the sequentially optimal second-period incentive 
rate does not depend on the observed productiv-
ity such that sequentially optimal incentives are 
implementable in long-term contracts. 
The next proposition emphasizes the impact of ex-
ante uncertainty about second-period firm value 
productivity ( "(2 ) and performance measure pro-
ductivity (B) on the profitability of long-term and 
short-term contracts. 
Proposition 3: Ceteris paribus, short-term con-
tracts are getting (weakly) more attractive a) the 
higher the prior variance of e and b) the higher 
the variance of E ( "Y2 I B). 
Proof. a) Writing E (82) = E (8)2 + V ar (B), IIL 
as defined in Lemma 1 is (weakly) decreas-
ing in V ar (B) and as II8 and II 5° do not de-
pend on Var (B), short-term contracting becomes 
more attractive if V ar (B) increases. b) Writing the 
term E{E b2 I 8)2 } in II8 and II80 as E (12) 2 + 
V ar(E(!2 I B)), 
Var (E(!2 I B)) = E [(E(I2 I B) - E(/2))2], both 
II8 and II8 0 as defined in Lemma 3 and Lemma 
4 are increasing in V ar ( E (12 I B)) . As II L does 
not depend on V ar ( E ( "Y2 I B)) the profitability of 
short -term contracts rises with V ar ( E ( "Y2 I B) ). • 
In long-term contracts the principal fixes second-
period incentives based on his prior information 
on e. The agent, however, selects his second-period 
action based on his observation e. As e is random 
ex ante the agent's second-period effort choice is 
a random variable as well (ex ante). The higher 
the dispersion of e the stronger the problem of 
motivating a second-period effort consistent with 
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e by an incentive rate independent of e. Similarly, 
the relative advantage generated by short-term 
contracts increases with 
Var (E (12 I 8)) = E [(E (12 I 8) - E (12))2] 
because with an increasing deviation from the prior 
mean the benefit ofbeing able to set second-period 
incentives knowing the posterior mean of "(2 con-
ditional on e becomes stronger. 
In the last part of this section we analyze dif-
ferences between short-term contracts with ob-
servable and with unobservable effort. As both 
regimes treat first-period effort differently there 
might be different recommendations for optimal 
performance measurement. We know from Propo-
sition 1 that a necessary condition for both regimes 
to be different is strategic first-period effort in 
combination with a multi-task problem in period 
one. If effort is observable the long-term effect of 
first-period actions is cut in equilibrium and each 
period is separately controlled via its performance 
measure. With unobservable effort the long-term 
effect of the agent's first-period effort is incen-
tive relevant; however, the second-period contract 
will be optimized only for the second-period ac-
tion. The potential advantage of not observing the 
agent's action is that long-term effort effects show 
up in equilibrium. The disadvantage is that these 
effects cannot be controlled as the second-period 
incentive rate will be chosen sequentially optimal. 
If the misallocation of first-period effort due to the 
uncontrollable strategic effect becomes too strong 
the principal is better off to cut the long-term effect 
which corresponds to the observable effort case. 
Proposition 4: Assume the condition in Propo-
sition 1 does not apply: 
a) If the first-period performance measure Y1 is 
perfectly congruent to n w.r.t. e1, i.e. gu I g12 = 
v11 lv12, observation of actions is strictly advan-
tageous, IT80 > IT8 . 
b) If Y1 is not congruent ton w.r.t. e1, then 
b1) IT8 0 - IT8 is decreasing in gu and if gu be-
comes sufficiently high, IT80 < IT8 • 
b2) If the long-term incentive component of un-
observable first-period effort, E ( ~2 ) v21, is suffi-
ciently strong, rrso > rrs. 
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Proof. From Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 
So S V12V2 1E ( ~) 
II -II = (2 2 ) 
2 vu + v12 
(g) 
X [ 2912V11 - 2gu V 12 + V21 V12E ( ~) l· 
By assumption: v 1 and v2 are linearly indepen-
dent. 
r ( 22. )]2 a) For 9..!!. = ~ rrso - rrs = V12V~1E 0 > 0. 
g12 Vt·J' 2(v2 +v2 ) ~ 11 12 
b1) a (IT8 0 - II8 ) I agu = -vi2~21 E( -71-) < 0 and 
v ll +v12 
as can be easily seen from (9) if gn is suffi-
ciently high (holding the other parameters con-
stant) IT80 < IT5 • b2) The strategic effect of first-
period effort is measured byE (s~* ) v21 if effort is 
unobservable, withE ( s:}*) = E ( ~2 ). 
From (9), if v21E (~2 ) becomes sufficiently high 
rrso - rrs > 0 . • 
Congruity of a performance measure with re-
spect to an effort vector as defined in Feltham 
and Xie (1994) is a necessary condition for the 
first-best effort being implementable through a 
performance measure. In our model the first-best 
effort in period 1 is ef 8 = (gn, g12)' . Ignoring 
the second period for the moment, first-best ef-
fort can be only induced via performance mea-
sure y1 alone, if the quotient of marginal firm 
value products g11 I g12 is equal to the quotient 
of marginal performance products of Yb vn l vl2· 
In this case, by setting the first-period incentive 
weight to s1 = .!l..!!. (= 9..!2) the first-best effort 
V11 V1 2 
ef8 can be induced in short-term contracts with 
observable effort as there is no strategic effect in 
equilibrium. With non-observable effort, however, 
action eu = s 1 vu + E ( -re) v21 is influenced by the 
long-term component E ( J ) v21 > 0 such that it is 
never possible to induce ef 8 and a welfare loss rel-
ative to the observable effort case occurs. If y1 is not 
congruent to n w.r.t. e 1 not observing first-period 
effort becomes more advantageous if the firm value 
productivity gu of eu is increasing. Notice that, 
holding all other parameters constant, with gu in-
creasing the importance of task eu relative to e12 
increases. With observable effort, both tasks will 
be determined solely by the first-period incentive 
rate s1 while with unobservable effort task en is 
also motivated by the strategic term E ( -re) v21 . As 
the importance of action en increases, measured 
by g11 , using the strategic performance effect be-
comes - although not controllable ex ante -more 
valuable. By a similar argument, ceteris paribus, 
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if the strategic effect E ( i) v2 1 is very strong the 
discrepancy between induced first-period actions 
e11 and e12 becomes inefficiently high such that the 
principal prefers an environment where no strate-
gic effect is present: this corresponds to the case 
where effort is observable. 
5 Implications for performance 
measurement and information 
system design 
Based on the results derived before in this sec-
tion we demonstrate implications for performance 
measurement and information system design. First, 
we analyze the value of unverifiable information 
in our model. In the agency-theoretic literature 
much effort has been made to analyze the value 
of additional information for the outcome of an 
agency (e.g., see Holmstrom's (1979) famous in-
formativeness result). While most of the literature 
focuses on the value of contractible information 
we investigate if it is optimal for the principal to 
install an information system that reports unveri-
fiable productivity information. Second, we inter-
pret our setting as one in which a manager works 
on a long-term construction contract and we spec-
ify the information system defined in Section 2 as 
representing either the completed contract method 
or the percentage of completion method of revenue 
recognition. We compare both accounting regimes 
of revenue recognition regarding their suitability to 
induce early and late effort in long- and short-term 
contracts. 
5.1 Value of unverifiable information B 
Until now we assumed that the principal's informa-
tion system unverifiably reports the productivity e 
at the end of the first period. In this section, we 
analyze whether it is indeed optimal for the firm 
to install an information system that reports e. If 
the principal's information system does not show e 
the agent selects his second-period action based on 
his prior belief on B, (similar to (2)) e2 = s2 E (B). 
Furthermore, in short-term contracts if the in-
formation system does not report e the principal 
sets sequentially optimal second-period incentives 
based on the joint prior distribution of (e) "/2) . The 
following proposition provides elementary con-
ditions for the information e having positive or 
negative value in different contracting regimes. 
Proposition 5: 
a) In every contracting regime: If the conditions 
of Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 apply simulta-
neously, observing e is always strictly beneficial. 
b) In short-term contracts with observable effort 
observing e can never be harmful. 
c) Assume the conditions of Proposition 1 and 
Proposition 2 do not apply simultaneously: 
C1) In long-term contracts: Observing e has neg-
ative value if e and ')'2 are independently dis-
tributed. 
c2) In short-term contracts with unobservable 
effort: Observing e has negative value if the fol-
lowing two conditions apply simultaneously: 1) 
e and ')'2 are independently distributed and 2) 
the relative productivity of first-period actions 
in performance measure Y1 exceeds the relative 
productivity of these actions in firm value 1r, 
vu / v12 > 9n / 912· 
Proof. See Appendix. • 
From Corollary 3 we know that under the con-
ditions of Propositions 1 and 2 the three different 
contracting regimes are equivalent and generate 
exactly the same surplus for the agency. Further-
more, the conditions ensure that the observation of 
B has no negative effect on first-period effort (Prop. 
1) and at the same time observing e is strictly ben-
eficial with respect to second-period effort (Prop. 
2 implies that equilibrium effort e2 varies with 
e, e2 = cB). In short-term contracts the second-
period incentive effect of observing e can never 
have negative value. As in short-term contracts 
with observable effort both periods are perfectly 
separated, there exist no negative effects from the 
second-period use of e on first-period effort such 
that observing e is always weakly beneficial. 
If e is reported in long-term contracts the agent 
is induced to select a second-period action that 
depends on B, e2 = s2B. This is valuable if B is 
closely related to firm value productivity "/2. If e 
is not related to firm value, however, the variation 
of e2 in e is costly for the firm and the principal 
does better without observing the signal. Here, not 
related means that "(2 and e are independently dis-
tributed. In this case, the observation of e does not 
help to direct the second-period action towards 
firm value. Rather, as the agent selects e2 = s2B 
the induced action is a costly random variable from 
the ex-ante perspective. Due to the agent's convex 
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cost of effort it can never be optimaF9 to induce 
different action levels across different realizations 
of performance productivities that are indepen-
dent of the firm value (the proof follows directly 
from Jensen's inequality). Hence, with indepen-
dent productivities e and "/2 an information system 
that does not reveal e dominates an information 
system that reports e in long-term contracts. 
In short-term contracts the agent not only chooses 
his action conditional on e but also the princi-
pal uses e to align second-period incentives with 
firm value. If effort is unobservable first-period 
incentives are influenced by the second-period in-
centive rate if v21 > 0. In this case not observing 
the productivity might be beneficial to avoid too-
strong distortions in first-period effort. Assume e 
and ry2 are independently distributed. Given inde-
pendence, observing e does not influence second-
period incentives, the induced second-period ac-
tion is e2 = E ("12) with and without observing e. 
The only difference is that with observable e e2 = 
s2e = E (ry2 ) is motivated via s2 = E~2 l whereas 
the corresponding bonus coefficient without ob-
serving e ( e2 = S2E (e)) is 82 = ~((;/. Induced 
first-periodstrategicaction en = s1v11 + E (s2) v21 
is in the first case eu = s1 vn + E b2) E ( ~) v21 and 
. h I . . E(i2 ) h'l m t e atter case 1t IS e11 = s1v11 + E(e) v21, w 1 e 
the operational action is always e12 = s1 v12. Since 
E ( ~) > ECOJ the induced strategic action with 
observable e is always higher than without ob-
serving e. If the relation of first-period firm value 
productivities gnl g12 is less than the correspond-
ing relation of performance productivities in y1, 
vu I v12, the induced relation en I e12 offirst -period 
actions via s1 alone, vn l v12, is already too high 
from the principal's view. Now, the optimal rela-
tion is further distorted by the long-term incentive 
effect E (s2) V21 · As E (s2) V21 is always lower if e is 
not observed an information system not reporting 
e is preferred if gu I g12 < Vn I VI2 . 
The general lesson from Proposition 5 is that ob-
serving the manager's productivity in a dynamic 
agency need not be beneficial for the outcome of 
the relationship. The value of unverifiably observ-
ing the agent's productivity in short-term contracts 
depends on whether the gains from possibly im-
proved second-period incentives offset the first-
2 9 A similar effect arises in Baker's (1992) private pre-decision 
information model. 
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period incentive effect. The second-period incen-
tive effect of e cannot be negative. In short-term 
contracts with observable effort the first-period 
incentive effect of e vanishes. With unobservable 
effort it might create costly misallocations of first-
period actions such that the overall effect of observ-
ing e can become negative. In long-term contracts 
even the second-period effect from observing e can 
become negative as the principal cannot respond 
to the observation of e such that induced e2 may 
become a costly random variable from the ex-ante 
perspective. 
In the literature the value of information in agen-
cies has been analyzed for different assumptions 
on the information's character, its timing, and the 
dynamics of the agency. It is well known that in a 
static one-shot agency additional contractible ex-
post information can never have negative value as 
the principal can always ignore it in the optimal 
contract. Holmstrom (1979) shows that an addi-
tional signal is valuable only if it is informative. 
If additional contractible information is observed, 
however, before the agent chooses his action the 
value of observing the signal may become nega-
tive.30 The problem with this kind of pre-decision 
information is that it cannot be ignored anymore 
as the agent chooses his action conditional on the 
signal which possibly makes inducing the desired 
action more costly. A similar effect arises in the 
long-term commitment setting in our model (see 
part C1 of Proposition 5). The agent chooses his 
second-period action depending on e which be-
comes costly for the principal if e is not related 
with firm value. The difference of our approach to 
the previous literature is that as e is not verifiable 
the principal cannot directly control this effect via 
contracting upon e. 
The results of Proposition 5 are also related to the 
literature that shows that in agencies with lim-
ited commitment information rationing may be 
optimal. Focussing on contractible information, 
Hofmann (20 05) shows that the value of interim 
reports may become negative and Indjejikian and 
Nanda (1999) stress that aggregation of informa-
tion may be optimal to mitigate the ratchet -effect. 
In Demski and Frimor (1999) and in Christensen, 
3° See Christensen and Demski (2003), chapter 13 . A similar 
effect has been shown in a double moral hazard relationship, 
where also the principal takes some productive decision, see 
Arya, Glover, and Sivaramakrishnan (1997). 
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Demski, and Frimor (2002) it may be optimal for 
the principal to induce earnings management by 
the agent to ration information. The positive effect 
of information rationing stems from the princi-
pal's desire to discipline his ex-post optimal be-
havior. Less detailed (interim) information biases 
the second-period incentive problem which in turn 
leads to less distorted first-period incentives. Are-
lated result is characterized in Proposition 5, part 
c2, for short-term contracts with unobservable ef-
fort for non-verifiable information e. The effect of 
the second-period bonus coefficient on first -period 
effort makes the principal better off without ob-
serving e. 
While the literature discussed above analyzed the 
value of contractible information, the investigation 
of the value of unverifiable information is rare 
in the agency-theoretic literature on performance 
measurement.31 Hermalin and Katz (1991) and 
Gigler and Hemmer (2004) consider a one-period 
agency where renegotiation takes place before the 
realization of the outcome but after the agent's 
action choice. After the agent has exerted effort 
but before the renegotiation stage an unverifiable 
signal is observed. Renegotiation turns out to be 
beneficial as it implicitly allows for contracting on 
the unverifiable signal. Their results differ from 
our paper as in their setting the unverifiable signal 
in equilibrium appears like an additional ex-post 
performance measure such that there can never 
be any negative distortions with respect to (early) 
effort. 
5.2 Revenue recognition: percentage of 
completion method versus completed 
contract method 
In this section we use the information system in-
troduced in Section 2 to investigate the incentive 
effects related to two accounting regimes of rev-
enue recognition: the percentage of completion 
method and the completed contract method. Un-
der the completed contract method revenues are 
recognized when the contract is fully completed. 
Under the percentage of completion method rev-
enues are allocated over periods according to the 
31 Here, I do not account for the mechanism design literature 
that has shown that problems with unverifiable information can 
be solved by revelation mechanisms (Maskin 1999, Moore and 
Repullo 1988). See Hermalin and Katz (1991) for a criticism 
on the use of revelation mechanisms to make unverifiable 
information verifiable. 
percentage of completion of the particular con-
tract. By specifying the productivity vectors v1 and 
v2 of the performance measures y1 and y2 defined 
in Section 2 appropriately we distinguish between 
the two revenue recognition methods as follows: 
Percentage of Completion: 
(10) Y1 = (v +a) en + v12e12 + "71; 
Y2 = ee2 + "72· 
Completed Contract: 
Y1 = ven + v12e12 + "71; 
Y2 = aeu + Be2 + r72 , 
v, a ~ 0. 
In the terminology of the information system 
introduced in Section 2 we have v11 = ( v + a) 
and v21 = 0 under the percentage of completion 
method, and v11 = v and v21 = a under the com-
pleted contract method, i.e. the total marginal 
product of e1 is equal in both systems but the 
timing differs. To add intuition to the two informa-
tion systems defined in (10) consider a two-period 
construction contract with effort e11 in period 1 
and e2 in period 2. The expected payment from 
the contract at the end of period 2 is aen + ee2; 
the estimated fraction completed at the end of the 
first period is aeu . veu and v12e12 are cash flows 
related to different projects besides the construc-
tion contract; they are realized in period one under 
both systems. The revenue from the construction 
contract at the end of the first period under the 
percentage of completion method is noisily mea-
sured as ae11 + "'a with "'a being a random vari-
able distributed on ( - oo, oo ). 'f/a is not correlated 
with other random variables of the model and has 
E (ria) = 0. Due to estimation errors noise in the 
measurement of the accrual is prevalent.32 The ac-
crual will be estimated by the firm's accountant. 
Though both contracting parties can observe the 
accrual, it is non-verifiable and cannot be used 
as a separate performance measure. It should be 
noticed that both systems of revenue recognition 
characterized in (10) and the assumption on the 
accrual are consistent with the information system 
introduced in Section 2. Under each method there 
is exactly one performance measure reported in 
each period. Formally, both information systems 
32 Compare also Kwon (1989). 
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differ only in the way the total marginal contribu-
tion of action e11 is allocated to the two periods. 
The fact that the accrual is noisily measured is 
irrelevant as both contracting parties are risk neu-
tral. Furthermore, the noise term 'rJa will be for-
mally absorbed by the random variable 771 under 
the percentage of completion method such that no 
reformulation of the information system defined 
in Section 2 is needed.33Jn a wider interpretation 
the model can be regarded as representing ei-
ther cash accounting (completed contract method) 
or accrual accounting (percentage of completion 
method). 
If the duration of the agency were equal to the 
firm's lifetime the contribution of the agent's ac-
tions to the firm's cash flows should be equal to 
their contribution to firm value. As argued at the 
beginning of Section 2, however, the firm's lifetime 
exceeds t = 2. In such a setting cash-flows typi-
cally do not adequately capture the influence of 
the agent's actions on the firm's future prospects. 
To give an example that extends the construction 
contract story, assume that higher effort eu and 
e2 implies a higher project quality. High quality is 
not only associated with a higher expected return 
but also with an increase in the probability that the 
firm can attain a similar job in the future t > 2. 
Naturally, these future prospects of the firm are 
not captured by the cash-flows and hence the con-
tribution of eu and e2 to firm value is higher than 
to the cash-flows of period 1 and period 2. 
Our objective is to derive conditions for the dom-
inance of one or the other system and to clarify 
the incentive effects emerging under both meth-
ods under different contracting environments. If 
33 Consider the completed contract method with noise 7]1 in 
period 1 and T/2 in period 2. Under the percentage of comple-
tion method aeu + "'a will be measured at the end of period 
1 and becomes an integral part of the first-period performance 
measure y 1 • Compared to the completed contract method the 
noise terms under percentage of completion should be differ-
ent. Specifically, based on the noise terms defined under the 
completed contract method, total noise of first -period earnings 
should be r11 + r)a· Define r1~ = r11 + r)a· Also, the second-
period noise term under the percentage of completion method, 
denote it 7]~ , should deviate from "72 (without additional struc-
ture nothing can be said about the relation of 'r/2 and "'~ but 
we assume here that E ( "1;) = 0). Formally, then we have 
noise terms ( r11 , 7]2 ) under the completed contract method and 
( ry~ , ry;) under the percentage of completion method. As all 
noise terms have mean zero and since other characteristics of 
the noise terms' distributions are irrelevant with risk-neutral 
contracting parties, we do not formally distinguish between 
( "71, "72 ) and ( "'~, "';) in (10) and the subsequent analysis. 
179 
the accrual is zero (a = 0) both methods are equiv-
alent by definition. Furthermore, both methods 
must be equivalent in all contracting environments 
if v12 = 0 as then there is only one action in period 
1 that can always be optimally motivated by the 
first-period incentive rate. In fact, v12 = 0 and/or 
a = 0 ensure for both systems that the ex-ante 
efficiency condition of Proposition 1 holds. To ex-
clude trivial cases we assume this condition does 
not apply in what follows. 
Analyzing long-term contracts first, we face a con-
tracting problem where the incentive contract is 
fixed at t = 0 and where the agent's action choices 
are given by (compare also (3)) 
eu=sl (v +a)} 
e 12 = s 1 v 12 percentage of completion method 
e 2 = s2e 
eu = s 1 v + s2a } 
e 12 = s 1 v 12 completed contract method 
e2 = s2e 
In short-term contracts the second-period incen-
tive rate will be chosen sequentially optimal, s2 = 
E('i le), so that the induced second-period effort 
is independent of the type of revenue recognition. 
The part of the principal's surplus that is related to 
the second-period action is E ( 12e2 - eJ) for both 
methods. Hence, when comparing both methods 
in short-term contracts we can without loss of 
generality compare the first-period effects. If the 
agent's effort is not observable the manager's in-
centive compatibility conditions for e 1 are given by 
(compare section 3.2.1, (6)) 
eu = 8 1 ( v +a) } percentage of completion method 
e 12 = s 1v 12 
e 11 = 8 1 v + E ( ~) a } completed contract method 
e12 = S1V12 
With observable actions the agent's first-period in-
centives in short- term contracts are given by 
en = s l (v +a)} . percentage of complet10n method 
e 12 = S1V 12 
eu = s 1v } completed contract method 
e12 = S1V 12 
As discussed in Section 3 .2.2, long-term effects of 
effort are eliminated in short-term contracts with 
BuR - Business Research 
Official Open Access Journal of YHilo 
Verband der Hochschullehrer fur Betriebswirtschi!ft e.V. 
Volume 1 I Issue 2 I December 08 1165-186 
observable effort. As under the percentage of com-
pletion method long-term effects are drawn into 
the first period the agent's incentives are the same 
as in the unobservable action setting. Furthermore, 
with observable effort the surplus generated un-
der the completed contract method is independent 
of the accrual component a as long-term effects 
vanish. 
Proposition 6: 
a) For all contracting regimes: If the operational 
action e12 is sufficiently valuable, the completed 
contract method dominates the percentage of 
completion method. 
b) In long-term contracts and in short-term con-
tracts with unobservable effort: If the second-
period action e2 is sufficiently valuable, the per-
centage of completion method dominates the com-
pleted contract method. 
c) In short-term contracts: If the strategic action 
en is sufficiently valuable, the percentage of com-
pletion method dominates the completed contract 
method. 
Proof. See Appendix. • 
If the operational action e12 is very important, par-
ticularly compared to the strategic action en, then 
the principal would like to differentiate between 
both first-period actions via the incentive sys-
tem. Under the percentage of completion method 
all financial consequences of first-period actions 
are measured in period one. Hence, both first-
period actions are exclusively motivated by the 
first-period incentive weight such that the rela-
tion between both actions, the quotient eu /e12 , 
is fixed. Under the completed contract method, 
however, the project's revenue due to action en is 
measured in period two such that it is possible to 
set strong incentives for the operational action e12 
via high s1 without increasing the strategic action 
en proportionally.34 If the second-period action e2 
is sufficiently valuable it is the other way around. 
Except for short-term contracts with observable 
actions the percentage of completion method is 
superior to the completed contract method. If rev-
34 In short-term contracts with observable effort, the long-term 
effect is cut. Here, the completed contract method dominates 
the percentage of completion method if e 12 is extremely valu-
able as the marginal contribution of action en in Yl is lower 
than under the percentage of completion method. 
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enues are recognized depending on the percentage 
of completion the second-period measure only de-
pends on second-period effort. Hence, the princi-
pal can set high-powered second-period incentives 
without influencing first-period actions which ex-
plains the dominance for that method here. As in 
short-term contracts with observable actions both 
periods are perfectly separated, the second-period 
action does not influence the comparison of both 
methods. 
If the strategic action eu is sufficiently valuable 
the percentage of completion method dominates 
the completed contract method in short-term con-
tracts. The reason is that in short-term contracts 
the second-period effect of task eu either cannot 
be controlled ex ante optimally (unobservable ef-
fort) or it is simply lost (observable effort) under 
the completed contract method. In contrast, under 
the percentage of completion method all effects of 
the task en will be measured in the first period 
such that it can be controlled ex ante optimally. 
6 Conclusion 
In this paper we analyzed a dynamic agency re-
lationship where contracting parties observe the 
agent's second-period productivity at the end of 
the first period. Firm value is not contractible 
such that effort incentives must be motivated via 
a performance measurement system. The agent's 
second-period productivity was assumed to be 
non-verifiable information. We considered three 
different contracting regimes: long-term full-com-
mitment contracts, short-term contracts with ob-
servable (but not verifiable) effort and short-term 
contracts with unobservable actions. In long-term 
contracts the principal can commit to second-
period incentives that are not ex-post optimal but 
he cannot respond to the observation of the agent's 
productivity. In short-term contracts the princi-
pal can always use the productivity information 
to fine-tune second-period incentives; however, 
the sequentially optimal second-period contract 
might harm first-period effort incentives. We de-
termined the equilibrium solution for each con-
tracting regime and based on these results we ana-
lyzed the trade-off of motivating first- and second-
period effort both between and within the three 
regimes. 
We first showed that if there is neither a multi-
task-problem in period 1 nor long-term effects of 
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first-period effort, then it is always possible to in-
duce the ex-ante efficient first-period actions in 
short-term contracts. We then derived that the 
sequentially optimal second-period incentive rate 
can be implemented in long-term contracts only 
if the posterior mean of second-period firm value 
productivity is a linear function of the observed 
productivity. Furthermore, we analyzed the influ-
ence of the prior variance of the agent's productiv-
ity. An increasing variance makes short-term con-
tracts more profitable relative to long-term con-
tracts as with increasing dispersion it gets more 
difficult to control the desired second-period ac-
tion without knowing its productivity in long-term 
contracts. 
The differences between short-term contracts with 
observable and with unobservable effort are as 
follows: If the principal observes the agent's first-
period effort, he offers a second-period contract 
that exactly meets the agent's second-period reser-
vation utility given the observed first-period ac-
tions. Hence, in equilibrium the second-period 
compensation does not create incentives for the 
first -period action choice even if there are strategic 
(i.e. long-term) performance effects, and in equi-
librium both periods are perfectly separated. If 
actions are unobservable, in contrast, long-term 
effects of effort emerge. Importantly, observing of 
the agent's actions needs not to be beneficial to 
the principal as all long-term incentives are elimi-
nated. 
Based on the results on the trade-off between moti-
vating first- and second-period effort we presented 
implications for performance measurement and 
information system design. 
First, we analyzed the value of observing the agent's 
productivity for the agency. Observation of the 
productivity has two effects in our model: Firstly, 
the agent selects his second-period action based 
on the productivity and secondly, (in short-term 
contracts) the principal uses the information to 
fine-tune the second-period incentive weight. In 
short-term contracts with observable effort notre-
porting the productivity can never be of any value 
as both periods are perfectly separated and for 
the second-period problem it is always (weakly) 
optimal to observe the information. In long-term 
contracts and in short-term contracts with unob-
servable effort, however, the use of the observation 
by the principal and by the agent may distort first-
period incentives in a way that it would be better 
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not to observe the signal. In addition, in long-term 
contracts installing an information system that re-
ports the agent's productivity may induce a costly 
uncontrollable random second-period effort. 
Second, we interpreted our setting as a two-period 
construction contract and compared two account-
ing regimes of revenue recognition: the percentage 
of completion method and the completed contract 
method. The distinguishing feature is that under 
the percentage of completion method all bene-
fits resulting from first-period effort are reported 
in the first-period measure while under the com-
pleted contract method they are recognized when 
the project is fully completed, at the end of period 
two. This difference is important as it crucially 
influences the trade-off of motivating early and 
late effort via changing the productivity vectors of 
the performance measures. We derived conditions 
for the dominance of one or the other method, 
depending on the value of the agent's actions. 
Appendix: Proofs 
Proof of Lemma 1 
The principal's problem to determine the optimal 
long-term contract is given in program (3). By 
substituting all constraints into the objective func-
tion (the participation constraint must bind at the 
optimum) this problem can be simplified as 
maxzL 
8 1 18 2 
911 ( s 1 v11 + s2v21) + 912s1 v 12 
1 2 1 2 2 
2( s1vu + s 2v21) - 2s 1v 12 
+ 
E(B2)s~ 
s2E (8ry2) - 2 . 
From 
911 V21 + E ( 8ry2) 
( 81 Vu + s2v2I)v21 - s2E ( 82) = 0 
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we obtain the optimal incentive weights as 
v§1912V12 - Vu V21E ( /2e) 
E (e2) (vrl + Vf2) + vr2v§l 
E ( e2) (9u vu + 912vl2) 
E (e2) ( 2 2 ) 2 2 Vn + V12 + V12V21 + 
( )( 2 2) 2 E 12B v11 + v12 + v129u v21 
( 2) ( 2 2 ) 2 2 E B Vu + vl2 + vl2v21 
v21 vu912v12 
and the principal's equilibrium surplus is (with 
IIL = z L (si, s:2)) 
+ 
+ 
2 [E (B2) (vfl + Vf2) + Vf2v§l j 
E (B2) (v12912 + 9nvn)2 
2 [E (e2) (vrl + Vf2) + vr2v§l] 
2E (/2B) V21 (9u Vf2 - 912V U V12) 
[ ( 2) ( 2 2 ) 2 2 l 2 E B Vu + vl2 + vl2v21 
E ( r 2B)2 ( Vf2 + vrl) 
+ 2 [E (e2) (vrl + Vf2) + vr2v§l]' 
Proof of Lemma 2 
The optimization problem for the optimal second-
period contract conditional on conjecture e1 is 
given by (4): 
max E ( 7r I e, et) - F2 - S2E (Y2 I e, et) 
F2,S2 
subject to 
e2 (B) = s2B 
E (F2 + s2Y2 1 y1 , B, et)- C2 (e2 (B)) ~ o. 
The objective function can be written as 
911 en + 912e12 + E (/2 I e) e2 (e) - F2 
- s2 ( v21 eu + ee2 (B)) . Removing terms that do not 
influence the optimization and substituting the in-
centive constraint and the binding participation 
constraint 
F2 + s2 (v21en + Be2 (B)) - e2 ~)2 = 0 into the ob-
jective function, the principal's objective function 
is reduced to 
From the first-order condition 
BE (12 I B)- s2B2 = 0 we get s~* = E(~IIIJ. 
Substituting s~* into the binding participation con-
straint and solving for F2 yields 
D S* _ E(-'!2 [11) - l E( IB)2 r 2 - --11- v21 e11 - 2 /2 · 
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Proof of Lemma 3 
Given the optimal second-period contract condi-
tional on e1 as defined in Lemma 2 the program 
to determine the optimal first-period contract is 
given by (7). By substituting the binding partic-
ipation constraint into the principal's objective 
function we obtain 
(11) 
1( ( 8* ) )2 +91281 v12 - 2 s1 vu + E s2 v21 
1 2 2 1 { 2} -2slv12 + 2E E (12 I B) 
withE (s2*) = E (i). From the optimality condi-
tion 
EJZ 8 ( 8* ) 2 
081 = 911 V u + 912V12- S1 V u + 82 V21 Vu-81 V12 = 





* 9u vu + 912v12 - E ( ~2 ) v21 vu 
Vfl + Vf2 
Substituting sf* into (11) yields the following equi-
librium surplus for the principal: 
(9uVu + 912v12 )2 
2 (vrl + vr2) 
+ 
2E (7!-) v21 (9u vr2 - 912v12vu ) 
2 (vrl + vr2) 
2 2 {E ("'~'' ) }2 v12v21 e 
2 (vrl + vr2) 
+ ~E{E b2 l B)2} . 
Proof of Lemma 4 
Program (8) can be simplified to 
2 2 (81v11 ) (8, v1.,) max81 9llS1V ll + 91281Vl2 - --2-- --2---. 
The optimal solution to this program is given by 
s]'* = gu v~ , +g~2v12 and the principal's correspond-
vll +v,2 
ing first-period equilibrium surplus is 
Z O* _ (gu vu +g12V12)2 
1 - (2 2) 2 Vu + v12 
Proof of Proposition 5 
a) From Corollary 3 we know that if the condi-
tions of Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 apply 
simultaneously: IIL = II8 = IT80 . The condition 
of Proposition 1 ensures that for the payoff and 
the incentives generated in period 1 it is immate-
rial whether or not B is observed. The principal's 
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surplus from period 2 is II2 = E ( 12e2 ) - E ( e§) / 2 
with e2 = s2B if B is observable and e2 = s2E (B) if 
not. Given the condition in Proposition 2 (s2 = c), 
II2bser. _ n~nobser. = ~ V ar (B) > 0. 
b) In short-term contracts with observable ef-
fort the principal's equilibrium payoff according 
to Lemma 4 is Z 0 * = Zf* + Z2, where Zf* is inde-
pendent of any characteristics of the second-period 
and 
Z2 = E{Eb2l B) 2 } = E(/z) 2 + Var(E (Iz l B)). 
If B is non-observable the principal's second pe-
riod payoff is Z2' = E ( 12) 2 • Hence, the value of 
observing B is v ar ( E (/z I B)) :::.:> 0. 
c) Assume the conditions of Proposition 1 and 
Proposition 2 do not apply simultaneously for the 
rest of the proof. 
c1) The principal's equilibrium payoff II L in long-




+ 2 [E (B2 ) (vr1 + Vf2) + Vf2V~l ] . 
Solving program (3) with e2 = s2E (B) instead 





2 [E (8) 2 (vj\ + viz) + vizv~1 ] 
E (fJ) 2 [ ( v12912 + 9n vn) 2 + 9izviz] 
2 [E(fJ)2 (vi1 + vi2 ) +vizv~1 ] 
E (8) 2 vf2E (rz)2 
2 [E (fJ) 2 (vi1 + vi2 ) + vf2v~l ] 
2E (!z) E(8)vz1 (9nvf2 - 912vn v 12) 
2 [E(fJ)2 (vf1 + vf2 ) + vfzv~l] 
If B and 12 are independent we have E (B12 ) 
E (B) E (/2) in IJL. Then the difference IJL- IJL' is 
given by 
c2) In Lemma 3 the principal's surplus in short-
term contracts with unobservable effort is given 
by 
+ 
(911 vu + 9 12v12 ) 2 
2(vfl+ viz) 
2E ( 2j-) V21 (911 vt2 - 912V12V11) 
2 (vil +viz) 
v2 v2 {E (ll)}z 1 
12 2\ ~ + -E{E bz l fJ)z} 
2(v11 + vd 2 
If B will not be reported the corresponding sur-
plus is 
From Jensen's inequality that E (b) - E( e) > 
0 such that both brackets [·] are positive. For 
gu/gl2 < vu / v12 II8 - II8 ' is always negative. 
Proof of Proposition 6 
The principal's surpluses: Substituting vu = ( v + a) 
and v21 = 0 for the percentage of completion 
method (PC) and vu = v and v21 = a for the 
completed contract method ( CC) into the princi-
pal's surplus functions given in Lemma 1, Lemma 
3, and Lemma 4, we obtain the following equilib-
rium payoffs 
L L' Var (8) (E (8 ) E (/z) ( vi1 +viz) + viz911 v21 - vz1 v n 912V12 ) 2 II - II = - < 0 
2 (E(fJ2 ) (vf1 + vf2 ) + vf2v~1 ) ( E (fJ) 2 (vf1 +vf2) + vf2v~1 ) -
+ 
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E (B2) (vl2912 + 9u (v + a))2 
2 [E (B2) ( (v + a)2 + vi2) J 
E Cr2B)2 ( vi2 + (v + a)2) 
2 [E (B2) ((v + a) 2 + vr2)] 
it follows that for each contracting regime k = 
L, S there exists a critical value E ( "f2)k' such that 
8J'::J,k joE("f2 ) > 0 if E("f2) > E('y2)k'. Further-
more, limE("Y2 )_,00 f::..L = +oo andlimE("Yz) --->oo f::..8 = 
+ oo. Hence, there exists a critical value E b 2)k 
such that f::..k > 0 for all E ("!2) > E b2)k . 
c) From 







2 [E (B2) (v2+ vr2) + vr2a2] 
2E Cr2B) a (9uvi2 - 912vv12) 
2 [E (B2) (v2+vr2) +vr2a2] 
E b2B)2 (vi2+v2) 
(9n (v + a) + 912V12)2 
2 ( ( v + a) 2 + vi2) 
~E { E b2 l B) 2 } 
9I1 v 2 + 29u V912V12 + 9?2vf2 
2 (v2 + vr2) 
2E (~)a (9nVf2 - V912V12) 
2 (v2 + vr2) 
2 2£( "'~2) 2 v 12a e 
2 (v2+vr2 ) 
~E{Eb2 IB)2 } 
and 
(jf::..S j a = av X 
9ll (a2+2av+v2+vf2 )(v2+v fz) 
{ 2 2 29u vv12 + 912v12 + 9uav12 - 912v - v912a 
- E ( i) X ( a2v12 + vr2 + 2av12V + V12v2)} 
it follows that for each k = S, So there exists 9~{ 
such that of::.. k I 0911 > 0 for all 911 > 9~{. Further-
!. A So + d l' A S _ more, 1m911 ___,= u = oo an 1m911 --->oo u -
+ oo. Hence, there exists a critical value 9~1 such 
that for all 9n > 9~1 , f::..k > 0. 
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